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THE FAILED PROMISE OF A GENERAL THEORY
OF PURE ECONOMIC LOSS: AN ACCIDENT
OF HISTORY?
Anthony J. Sebok*
INTRODUCTION
A festschrift in honor of the work and career of Robert Rabin of-
fers the tort scholar an overwhelming range of topics from which to
draw inspiration. Rabin's range and contributions are broad. In this
Article, I have chosen to closely examine Rabin's contributions to the
problem of pure economic loss in American law. Although this Arti-
cle is critical of some of Rabin's claims at various points in his career, I
hope the closeness with which I have attempted to read his work in
this area indicates how deep my respect is for the work he has done.
Between 1985 and 1986, Robert Rabin and Gary Schwartz each
published an article on the emerging issue of pure economic loss in
American tort law.' The near-simultaneous timing of these articles
may have been a quirk of academic calendaring-Schwartz later re-
marked that "the only reason Rabin and I chose to address the prob-
lem [was] that the two of us were invited to attend a conference-in
England-on the topic of negligence law and economic loss."2 Re-
gardless of the reason for the simultaneous examination of the topic,
the contrast between Rabin's and Schwartz's approaches is interesting
for a number of reasons. First, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, Ra-
bin and Schwartz differed in important ways over the proper interpre-
tation of claims for pure economic loss in tort law. Second, Rabin's
view of pure economic loss in tort law has shifted, as evidenced by his
* Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, New York, New York.
1. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A
Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985) [hereinafter Rabin, Tort Recovery]; Gary T.
Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of J'Aire and of Products Lia-
bility, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 37 (1986) [hereinafter Schwartz, Economic Loss].
2. Gary T. Schwartz, American Tort Law and the (Supposed) Economic Loss Rule, in PURE
EcoNomic Loss IN EUROPE 94, 96 (Mauro Bussani & Vernon Valentine Palmer eds., 2003)
[hereinafter Schwartz, American Tort Law].
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next major treatment of the topic in 2006.3 This Article will consider
the significance of that shift.
II. THE PROMISE OF FAIRE
Like many American tort scholars, Schwartz was skeptical of the
significance of pure economic loss.4 He wrote in 2003 that not much
had changed since he wrote about the subject in 1986 and that it "re-
main[ed] a backwater within the discourse of American tort law." 5
His 1986 article offered two reasons for this. The first was that "any
effort to formulate any single general theory" of pure economic loss
was doomed to failure. 6 There are, Schwartz noted, too many diverse
kinds of torts that involve economic injuries, and nothing binds them
together, despite the recent ambitious attempts by "a number of
scholars."7 This was classic Schwartz-the criticism of tort theorists
who sought to reduce all of torts to a single grand theory character-
ized some of his most important writing.8
But Schwartz's critique was more than a plea for pluralism. He
feared that "a generic tort for the negligent infliction of economic
harm" would risk "improperly ignoring or disparaging the authority
and intelligence" of existing legal doctrines that already inhabited the
world of economic relations and loss.9 Although the immediate exam-
ples Schwartz offered to illustrate his point were the torts of malicious
prosecution and abuse of process, the balance of his article reveals his
true concern-that the "deployment of tort generalizations" could in-
terfere with another very important field of private law: contract
law.' 0 His article used two California cases to illustrate his point:
3. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries and the Economic Loss Rule in Tort,
48 ARIz. L. REV. 857 (2006) [hereinafter Rabin, Respecting Boundaries] (reviewing changes in
the law of pure economic loss since 1985).
4. Schwartz, Economic Loss, supra note 1, at 37-40; see also Bruce Feldthusen, What the
United States Taught the Commonwealth About Pure Economic Loss: Time to Repay the Favor,
38 PEPP. L. REV. 309, 313 (2011) ("[P]ure economic loss had not yet been recognized as an
organizing category of negligence law.... My supervisors simply did not recognize the term.").
5. Schwartz, American Tort Law, supra note 2, at 96.
6. See Schwartz, Economic Loss, supra note 1, at 38.
7. Id. at 37-38 (citing Richard Abel, Should Tort Law Protect Property Against Accidental
Loss?, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79 (1986); W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1982); Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1; Mario J. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss
in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL SrUD. 281 (1982)).
8. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997) (arguing that tort law can be explained only by a
blend of the leading tort theories of the day).
9. See Schwartz, Economic Loss, supra note 1, at 39.
10. Id. at 39-40.
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I'Aire Corp. v. Gregory" and Seely v. White Motor Co.12 Schwartz
thought poorly of J'Aire and praised Seely,' 3 but that did not make his
contribution unique. The interesting feature of his 1986 article was his
characterization of J'Aire's flaws and Seely's virtues, which illustrated
the risks and rewards of allowing tort to overwhelm contract law.
J'Aire involved a suit between the tenant of a commercial space and
a contractor who had been hired by the building's landlord to prepare
the space for the tenant.14 The contractor failed to timely complete
the work as promised, and as a result, the landlord could not deliver
the space to the tenant, who suffered a loss of expected profits."
Schwartz found many things about Seely to be fishy. His first reac-
tion was to ask why the tenant did not sue the landlord for breach of
contract.16 It turned out that Schwartz actually contacted the lawyer
for the tenant and asked him this question. The response, as reported
by Schwartz, was that the tenant had a long-standing and friendly rela-
tionship with the landlord that the tenant did not want to disturb by a
lawsuit.' 7 Schwartz's second reaction was to ask why the tenant did
not claim against the contractor in contract as a third-party benefici-
ary to the contract between the contractor and the landlord. Here
too, Schwartz ferreted out the answer: the tenant's lawyer admitted to
Schwartz, "[C]ontracts were never my strong point in law school."18
Schwartz's faux-nafve inquiries about the actual history of J'Aire
are of a piece with his subsequent theoretical argument against the
case. He did not argue that the California Supreme Court got its tort
law wrong according to some set of principles that define and govern
negligence as much as he argued that the California Supreme Court
allowed human factors (the tenant's desire to maintain good relations
with the landlord and the lawyer's ignorance) to drive it to create a
cause of action where none was needed. Significantly, Schwartz's cri-
tique went beyond making the argument that the rule in J'Aire would
be hard to cabin, although he made this point as well in a series of
clever hypotheticals.19
Schwartz's argument went further. He concluded from the fact that
it would be hard to draw lines in the application of the J'Aire rule and
11. See id. at 40-50 (citing 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979)).
12. See id. at 51-56 (citing 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965)).
13. Id. at 78.
14. J'Aire, 598 P.2d at 62.
15. Id.
16. Schwartz, Economic Loss, supra note 1, at 41.
17. Id. at 41.
18. Id. at 43.
19. See id. at 42-50.
2012] 617
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
the fact that another body of law already provided answers-albeit
ones that favored the defendant-that the resources of tort law were
not adequate to explain why there was no duty on the part of the
contractor.20 Schwartz conceded that his argument "treat[ed] tort and
contract as dichotomous." 2 1 Yet, he defended his decision to place the
plaintiff's economic interests at risk in I'Aire on the contract side not
by reference to how tort would handle the problem, but by reference
to the fact that it fell outside the domain of tort entirely. 22
While I am not sure that Schwartz was altogether fair to Rabin
when he included Rabin among the scholars who had "attempted to
develop a general theory to cover the problem of tort law and eco-
nomic loss,"23 Schwartz's characterization of Rabin as "strongly sym-
pathetic" to J'Aire in 1985 seems correct. 24 To be precise, in his 1985
article, Rabin did not praise the California Supreme Court's reason-
ing-he twice called its reasoning relating to foreseeability "mud-
dled." 25 But Rabin praised J'Aire for two reasons. First, he felt that
the court's reasoning implied the rejection of the view that pure eco-
nomic loss was "a singular problem" whose difficulties were not a
product of larger theoretical issues shared throughout tort law.2 6
What made pure economic loss cases hard, in other words, was a prob-
lem found throughout tort law, "widespread tort liability." 27 In fact,
Rabin claimed, where this feature was absent, cases involving pure
economic loss "[did] not receive distinctive treatment"; they were
treated as garden-variety negligence cases. 28
Rabin's second reason for praising J'Aire was that its discussion of
foreseeability in negligence law, albeit muddled, helped illuminate the
generic feature of tort law, which made pure economic loss cases seem
sui generis to people like Schwartz. Pure economic loss cases were
hard because they were the latest and perhaps most novel iteration of
the problem of widespread tort liability-a problem faced by courts in
20. See id. at 40-43.
21. Id. at 49.
22. See Schwartz, Economic Loss, supra note 1, at 49-50.
23. Id. at 37-38 (citing Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1).
24. Id. at 40.
25. Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1518, 1522.
26. See id. at 1514.
27. Id. at 1514-15.
28. Id. at 1515. Rabin referred to Williams v. State, 644 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983), regarding munic-
ipal liability for the lost opportunity to recover damages in a tort suit due to a police officer's
failure to obtain the identity of the driver who struck the plaintiff, and George A. Hormel & Co.
v. Maez, 92 Cal. App. 3d 963 (Cal. 1979), regarding a driver's liability for negligently striking a
pole, causing an electrical surge that burned out a machine in the plaintiffs factory and idled two
employees. Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, 1515-16.
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previous generations in the context of other debates over the limits of
negligence liability.29 Rabin noted:
The common thread running through [judicial] limitations on re-
covery for emotional distress, consortium, and economic loss is not
difficult to identify. Contrary to the assertion in J'Aire, it does not
rest on the presence or absence of foreseeability. Rather, it is an
age-old concern about extending liability ad infinitum for the conse-
quences of a negligent act.30
Rabin's claim that the J'Aire court was correct to treat pure economic
loss as merely a species of the more general problem of negligence
was aided by some specific features of California negligence law-fea-
tures that may have been unique for that place and time. 31 The court,
Rabin noted, built its argument for a duty between the contractor and
the tenant out of "situationally diverse injury cases," none of which
had anything to do with economic injury.32 The court relied upon Dil-
lon v. Legg, which expanded the rule for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress (NIED); 33 Rowland v. Christian, which removed the
special categories of duty for landowners; 34 Brown v. Merlo, which
expanded the duty of drivers to guests; 3 5 Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., which expanded the scope of loss of consortium;36 and Weirum
v. RKO General, Inc., which expanded duty broadly to include the
foreseeable consequences of speech.37
Ironically, Rabin noted, these cases, which arguably represented the
high watermark of the California Supreme Court's expansion of duty,
owed their distinctive approach to duty to a 1958 case called Biakanja
v. Irving.38 This case was one of the earliest exceptions to the rule
excluding pure economic loss and involved a legatee who lost an in-
heritance due to the carelessness of a notary.39 The California Su-
preme Court was much more aware in Biakanja than J'Aire that it was
dealing with economic loss. Still, despite this fact (or because of it) it
set out a test of duty that seemed to go out of its way to establish the
29. See Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1522-24.
30. Id. at 1526.
31. See id. at 1518 (describing the California Supreme Court's activism in tort law over the
previous twenty years as "arguably without parallel" in the United States).
32. Id. at 1519.
33. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
34. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
35. 506 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1973).
36. 525 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1974).
37. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
38. Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1518.
39. Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 17-18 (Cal. 1958).
2012] 619
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defendant's duty without regard to the fact that the plaintiff's injury
was purely economic:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will
be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy
and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the
extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff,
the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame at-
tached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing fu-
ture harm.40
As Rabin noted, "Biakanja v. Irving, the foundation case in establish-
ing the duty criteria for all varieties of tortious harm, was itself a case
of exclusively economic loss."41 For Rabin this was interesting be-
cause the next case that followed Biakanja and involved pure eco-
nomic loss, Heyer v. Flaig, did not emphasize the economic loss aspect
at all;4 2 Rabin thought it was obvious why it would not.4 3 There was
nothing unique about the loss that required any special analysis given
the goals of California's multifactor test for duty. Thus, Rabin con-
cluded that the result in J'Aire-given Biakanja and Heyer, both of
which came before it-was "no great surprise." 44 I think it likely that
Schwartz would have disagreed even with this simple claim.
But Rabin's goal in his 1985 article was not just to praise I'Aire or
to place it within the context of the emerging Rowland-style duty anal-
ysis emerging from the California courts. He was well aware of the
40. Id. at 19.
41. Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1519 (second emphasis added). Another interest-
ing contribution of Rabin's 1985 article was the link it drew between the factors listed in
Biakanja and the test made famous in Rowland. See id. at 1518-19. Rowland's test was slightly
different; the default rule of duty to act reasonably would be defeated depending on
the balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of
harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the close-
ness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm,
the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of im-
posing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability,
cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
Of course, not everyone would agree that a defender of Biakanja ought to be proud of any
genealogical link to Rowland. For example, John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky have argued that
Rowland's multifactor balancing test is not really a test for duty at all, but rather a "form of duty
skepticism," and further that Rowland-type duty skepticism has had a baleful influence on the
Restatement (Third). See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement
(Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 694-97 (2001).
42. 449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969).
43. See Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1520-21.
44. Id. at 1521.
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reaction of skeptics like Schwartz, who saw the courts' treatment of
pure economic loss as anomalous, and he tried to explain its natural
evolution in California's duty analysis. That is, given that some cases
involving pure economic loss elicited no special comment at all, why
was there a presumption that pure economic loss cases were either
outside of tort entirely or, if within tort, required a special
justification?
Rabin argued economic loss cases like Biakanja, Heyer, and J'Aire
only looked easy because of a contingent feature buried in their facts
that rendered them nonthreatening to the courts.45 Because the plain-
tiff was easily identifiable to the respective defendant before the de-
fendant's breach of duty, the courts were not concerned about
imposing a duty on the defendant after the fact. 46 Rabin called cases
such as these-where the defendant (a notary, lawyer, or contractor)
knew in advance that his carelessness would affect the economic inter-
ests of an identifiable third party (a legatee, an heir, or a tenant)-
"third-party situations" 47 or "triangular configurations." 48 The resis-
tance to imposing duty in cases of pure economic loss was overcome,
from the perspective of the California courts, because they could line
up each of the Rowland factors in cases of pure economic loss just like
they did in a third-party situation like Tarasoff v. Regents of the Uni-
versity of California.49 The key to imposing the duty in J'Aire and
Tarasoff was that the plaintiffs' injuries, whether economic or physi-
cal, were foreseeable.50
But Rabin cleverly used the triumphalism in J'Aire against itself.
He reminded the reader that foreseeability was not as easy or obvious
to determine in the important cases that formed the canon of the
Rowland-style duty analysis.51 The "tough" cases, in Rabin's mind,
were case like Dillon and Borer v. American Airlines, Inc.,52 in which
foreseeability was a necessary but not sufficient condition for duty.53
The recent history of negligence law, Rabin argued, showed that the
same concern that led courts to reject and then arbitrarily limit duty in
cases of NIED and loss of consortium had led courts to declare that
45. See id. at 1521.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1527.
49. See 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976).
50. See Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1521.
51. See id. at 1522.
52. 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977).
53. See Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1522-23.
6212012]
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there was no duty in cases of pure economic loss. 54 The real challenge
to the Rowland-style duty analysis was not determining whether an
unreasonable act would foreseeably interfere with another's interest,
but rather deciding what to do if it turned out that the tort liability
resulting from the foreseeable interferences would be "widespread"
and thus somehow outside the practical scope of the tort system.55
For Rabin, J'Aire was an easy case because it did not pose to the
courts the challenge of widespread liability. According to Rabin,
"there is a simple and straightforward explanation for the sustained
reluctance of the courts to extend liability for economic loss beyond
'the triangular configuration' to situations of widespread harm."5 6
That explanation was the "normative" constraint in tort-even under
the Rowland-style duty analysis-on "disproportionate penalties for
wrongful behavior."57 As long as the quantum of damages resulting
from a tort claim was proportionate to the "private wrongs" commit-
ted by the defendant, negligence law could accommodate the claim,
regardless of the type of injury to which it referred-physical, emo-
tional, economic, or otherwise.
Rabin's observation that the fear of widespread harm provided the
real backstop to duty in negligence law led him to draw a number of
conclusions, some optimistic and some pessimistic. The first and
mostly optimistic conclusion was that there was nothing intrinsic to
pure economic loss that made it any less the proper subject of duties
in negligence than personal injury and NIED.5 8 The second and
slightly pessimistic conclusion was that foreseeability played a much
less important role in explaining the line drawn between duty and no-
duty cases than the California courts purported.59 The third and most
interesting conclusion was that, from a historical perspective, fear of
widespread liability could be overcome.60 Rabin noted that Lord Ab-
inger cited the fear of widespread liability to justify limiting duty in
negligence to privity in Winterbottom v. Wright.61 The fear of wide-
spread liability was also cited in Ryan v. New York Central Railroad
54. See id. at 1523.
55. See id. at 1524.
56. Id. at 1534 (footnote omitted).
57. Id.
58. See id. at 1526-27.
59. See Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1526.
60. Id. at 1533.
61. Id. at 1529; see also Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. Div.) 405
("[I]f the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the road ... might
bring a similar action.").
622 [Vol. 61:615
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Co.6 2 and H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. 6 3 Rabin noted that,
in cases of personal injury and property, the widespread liability argu-
ment gradually lost its force.64 By 1985 the risk of widespread liability
played no role in limiting otherwise good claims against a product
manufacturer, "[n]or would tort liability be in doubt in the structural
collapse of a negligently constructed building, even if a large number
of injuries occurred." 65
According to Rabin, the problem of widespread injury arising from
foreseeable interference with the person and property of another "has
dissolved" by "case law that has steadily eroded the duty limitations"
to the point where it no longer exerted any pressure at all, so that the
Rowland factors-especially foreseeability-could operate without
any resistance.66 In the case of other types of injury, the concern for
widespread harm still played an important role in blocking the opera-
tion of the Rowland factors, which explained the arbitrary rules for
NIED and loss of consortium produced in the 1970s and 1980s and the
persistence of the so-called exclusionary rule for pure economic loss. 6 7
Rabin did not underplay the significance of the problem posed by
the concern for widespread harm for pure economic loss, but he
wanted to be clear about the kind of problem it was. It was not, as he
had argued, a problem that arose out of the fact that the interest pro-
tected by cases like J'Aire was purely economic. 68 That was a contin-
gent feature of the problem, as evidenced by the fact that another
interest, pure emotional distress, was experiencing the same pattern of
resistance (albeit in a lesser form).69 The problem was a normative
problem concerning the operation of moral luck in tort law.7 o To put
it bluntly, pure economic loss cases, as a class, were more likely to
62. Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1530 (quoting Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y.
210, 216-17 (1866) ("To hold that the owner must not only meet his own loss by fire, but that he
must guarantee the security of his neighbors on both sides, and to an unlimited extent, would be
to create a liability which would be the destruction of all civilized society.")).
63. Id. at 1531; see also H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 168 (1928)
("We are satisfied that liability would be unduly and indeed indefinitely extended by this en-
largement of the zone of duty.").
64. Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1531-32.
65. Id. at 1532. After 2001, Rabin had the opportunity to consider an analogous situation,
albeit with tragically different facts. See Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm in the
Context of September 11, 88 VA. L. REv. 1831, 1860 (2002) (arguing that the question of duty on
the part of airlines and building-owner defendants to persons inside the World Trade Center "is
an issue that can be addressed under the guise of foreseeability, if a court sees fit to do so").
66. Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1532-33.
67. Id. at 1533.
68. See id. at 1519-20.
69. See id. at 1524.
70. See id. at 1534.
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expose the conflict between the reach of duty in negligence and "[t]he
Anglo-American judicial tradition['s] . . . deep abhorrence to the no-
tion of disproportionate penalties for wrongful behavior." 7'
This Article is not the proper place to examine the validity of Ra-
bin's claim that there is a special sensitivity in to disproportionate
punishment in Anglo-American common law jurisdictions.72 What in-
terests me is the way Rabin treated this "moral fact": in his hands, it
was a justification for limitation of pure economic loss in cases where
injury was foreseeable but widespread.73 Earlier in his article, Rabin
divided the universe of pure economic loss cases. 74 In the first group
were the triangular configurations, discussed above.75 In the second
group were cases in which the defendant's negligence caused "collat-
eral" economic loss to the plaintiff, usually by negligently damaging
some property (or sometimes the person) of a third party upon which
the plaintiff (foreseeably) relied. 76 The classic example of this is the
negligent destruction of a bridge upon which the plaintiff relied to
bring customers to his commercial establishment.77 The law of negli-
gence, argued Rabin, could handle the triangular configuration cases
and regularly did so in California without even emphasizing the fact
that they were cases of pure economic loss.7 8 But the same courts
treated the collateral economic loss cases differently, emphasizing
their uniqueness as pure economic loss cases.79 In both sets of cases,
Rabin noted, the question (and test) of foreseeability was the same,80
and therefore, he concluded that the different treatment was moti-
vated by the normative objection to holding defendants in the collat-
71. Id.
72. It is worth mentioning that the American legal system has a host of punitive elements that
are not found in civilian systems (or even to the same extent as other common law systems).
Consider, for example, punitive damages and the death penalty. Furthermore, it would seem
that the criminal sanctions imposed by American jurisdictions are generally harsher than in civil-
ian systems. Ironically, the common (and somewhat fair) stereotype is that civilian jurisdictions
have permitted negligence for pure economic loss more broadly than the United States. It is
possible, of course, that Rabin's observation was true when he said it and that it was consistent
with the further claim that other judicial traditions (such as the civilian tradition) are even more
hostile to disproportionate penalties for wrongful behavior. But that would merely beg the ques-
tion of whether a concern for moral luck is feature of tort law.
73. See Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1526.
74. Id. at 1527.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1528.
77. Id.; see also Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 590 (W. Va. 2000) (holding that the defen-
dant owed no duty to the plaintiff motel owner for lost profits during the period required for
repair after the defendant's truck had negligently struck a bridge over the highway).
78. See Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1518-21.
79. See id. at 1528.
80. See id. ("Again, foreseeability provides no guidance.").
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eral economic cases liable for damages far in excess of their
wrongdoing.81
Rabin's article left the reader with the impression that he thought
the law had struck the right balance when it came to pure economic
loss. While he never explicitly endorsed the idea that duty liability
ought to be limited when it results in disproportionate penalties, that
is not surprising-Rabin probably did not feel obliged to defend a
widely shared moral value. His task would have been to accurately
identify the reasons used by the courts and to see whether they were
using them consistently and intelligibly. A court would be working
within the Rowland-type approach to duty by invoking fear of wide-
spread loss to limit duty. In any case, while Rowland did not end with
the invocation of foreseeability, it allowed courts to balance foresee-
ability of injury against other factors, including:
the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant
and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 82
Rabin did just that-he pointed out that collateral economic loss cases
may involve foreseeable injuries, but they fare poorly on most of the
other Rowland factors.83 As already noted, they flunk the test of
moral blame-if not of the defendant's conduct, then of the moral
justification for imposing the costs of the accident on the defendant.
Rabin ended the article by noting that many collateral economic
loss cases might also fail the consequentialist factors of the Rowland
test.84 Using the example of a driver who negligently blocks the
Brooklyn Battery Tunnel,85 Rabin noted that it is unlikely that the
threat of liability for all the foreseeable economic losses flowing from
the tunnel's blockage would produce additional deterrence, nor would
the availability of insurance favor liability.86 In collateral economic
loss cases, "economic and moral foundations"a supported the com-
mon law's historical rejection of liability for foreseeable pure eco-
nomic loss. The article concluded with cautious praise for the status
quo achieved by the J'Aire court:
81. See id. at 1534.
82. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
83. See Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1537-38.
84. See id. at 1536-38.
85. This example was drawn from Cargill, Inc. v. City of Buffalo (In re Kinsman Transit Co.),
388 F.2d 821, 825 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968).
86. Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1536-38.
87. Id. at 1535-36.
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In the final analysis, judges have seen fit to distinguish between "di-
rect" and "indirect" economic losses as best they can. The lines
have not always been clearly drawn and some may be indefensible.
But the central tendency to deny liability for categories of wide-
spread loss has appealed to an enduring sense of fairness.88
III. REALITY BITES: PEOPLE ExPREss
Rabin's next extended discussion of pure economic loss (other than
his casebook) was in a 2006 contribution to a symposium on economic
tort law in honor of Daniel B. Dobbs.8 9 The article was somewhat
different in tone and structure than the 1985 article. Whereas in 1985
Rabin focused on the development of recovery for pure economic loss
in California, in his 2006 article, Rabin shifted his focus to New Jersey.
Rabin's treatment of the California cases he reviewed in 1985 was
generally positive; he viewed the development of the duty identified in
J'Aire as a natural extension of the multifactor approach begun in
Biakanja (a pure economic loss case) and brought to fruition in Row-
land (a personal injury case).90 However, his treatment of the New
Jersey cases was much more skeptical. The major New Jersey case
that rejected the rule of no duty to avoid foreseeable pure economic
loss was People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp.91
Like J'Aire, it came on the heels of many progressive decisions that
expanded duty in cases involving personal injury. There was even a
case in this prior history that played a role quite similar to that played
by Biakanja-H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, in which the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that an auditor could be liable to third par-
ties other than his client for negligent misrepresentations causing pure
economic loss. 92 Despite these superficial similarities, there was no
suggestion that the New Jersey cases were defensible applications of
the general principles of negligence law. Quite the contrary, Rabin
was sorry to report that "the bold thrust of the New Jersey court in
limiting the no-duty domain of negligently inflicted economic loss is
largely a historical artifact. . . . [People Express] stands as a lonely
outpost. ... Rosenblum has been treated as an outlier." 93
Rabin's pessimism was not just a result of the fact that he was re-
porting bad news for those who may have hoped that negligence
would become more welcoming to pure economic loss in the years
88. Id. at 1538.
89. See Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3.
90. See Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1519.
91. 495 A.2d 107, 118 (N.J. 1985).
92. 461 A.2d 138, 153 (N.J. 1983).
93. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 858.
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since J'Aire and People Express. He also adopted a decidedly more
critical tone when describing the theoretical status of claims in negli-
gence for pure economic loss. In 1985 Rabin emphasized that pure
economic loss cases were just like other cases in negligence 94 and that
the result of seeing pure economic loss cases as just like other negli-
gence cases illuminated the way that the concern for disproportionate
penalties played the same role it had played in the determination of
duty in other kinds of negligence. 95 In 2006, Rabin began his article
by stating, "I want to emphasize that the constraints imposed by the
economic loss rule do not, as I see it, reflect any single normative prin-
ciple."96 More specifically, rather than seeing the law of pure eco-
nomic loss as a product of a "simple and straightforward" dynamic 9 7-
the tension between foreseeability and the norm against excessive
punishment-Rabin concluded in 2006 that he saw no common theme
that explained the pattern of rules governing whether pure economic
loss would fall inside or outside the negligence concept. 98 He found
that there were three different kinds of pure economic loss cases, not
two, and the factors that explained why duty was or was not extended
to those cases had nothing to do with each other.99
Let me be clear that I am not accusing Rabin of contradicting him-
self. Rather, it is that he took the same analysis of duty in negligence
and emphasized different implications and possibilities in 2006 com-
pared to 1985. In both articles he argued, in contrast with Schwartz,
that the modern duty rules of pure economic loss are explained by
general principles of negligence-that is, that the same factors under-
pin the duty rules in pure economic loss and personal injury, including
NIED and loss of consortium. Given that "the mantle of progressiv-
ism" shared by New Jersey and California (as Rabin put it)100 was a
product of the "balancing of factors" approach in Rowland and its
progeny, it would follow that these general principles of negligence
would continue to guide the development of duty rules for pure eco-
nomic loss. Further, given that the product of the balancing-of-factors
94. See Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1518 ("[M]y contention [is] that economic loss
does not present a singular problem of liability in tort.").
95. See id. at 1534 (stating that "there is a simple and straightforward explanation for the
sustained reluctance of the courts to extend" duty in pure economic loss cases).
96. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 859 (emphasis added).
97. Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1534.
98. See Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 859.
99. See id. at 869 ("[In one set of cases], the economic loss rule highlights the tension between
tort and contract.. . . From another vantage point, the rule tests the enduring tort concern over
the prospect of crushing liability.. . . In still other cases, it tests the limits of fiduciary obligations
100. See Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 857.
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approach in Rowland was judged by Rabin to have produced rules
concerning personal injury and pure economic loss that "appealed to
an enduring sense of fairness,"101 it would not be unreasonable to con-
clude that the application of the same general principles to pure eco-
nomic loss cases after 1985 would have produced results that also
appealed to an enduring sense of fairness.
This is, I think, a fair reading of Rabin's 1985 account, but not a
necessary reading. As he noted in 2006, his account of the role of
normative judgments in concerning widespread loss in California's
emerging theory of duty was "historical," not normative, and as such,
it was a hostage to fortune.102 His historical account of the efforts by
courts since J'Aire to treat pure economic loss just like the law of re-
covery for NIED and loss of consortium presented a historical ac-
count that felt very different from the one offered in 1985. It was not
a description of how courts balanced one normative commitment (the
fear of widespread loss) against a set of factors employed by judges
generally in all negligence cases (such as foreseeabilty), but rather a
description of how courts have invoked various idiosyncratic formalis-
tic categories under the guise of policy considerations103 to create, as
Jane Stapleton scornfully put it, "crude pockets" of liability.104 It was,
in short, a concession that the law of pure economic loss does not lend
itself to a simple and straightforward normative explanation.
A number of reasons may explain the change in Rabin's attitude
toward the capacity of negligence law to provide a satisfactory theo-
retical account of duty in pure economic loss cases. I will suggest two.
First, the universe of cases under Rabin's scrutiny seems to have ex-
panded in his 2006 article. I say "seems" because, as I will argue-and
this will comprise my second reason-the deeper cause of Rabin's
pessimism was not that he discovered that the universe of pure eco-
nomic loss cases was broader and more complex than he had first
thought, but because he discovered that the balancing-of-factors ap-
proach, which had seemed to have performed satisfactorily in J'Aire,
was not even capable of solving the class of cases he discussed in 1985.
Rabin conceded in his 2006 article that he had focused on only a
slice of the pure economic loss universe, and he set out to correct (or
supplement) his earlier article.105 He now characterized pure eco-
101. Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1538.
102. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 859 & n.13.
103. See id. at 859.
104. Jane Stapleton, Comparative Economic Loss: Lessons from Case-Law-Focused "Middle
Theory," 50 UCLA L. REV. 531, 537 (2002).
105. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 859 n.13.
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nomic loss cases as falling within the following prototypical categories:
tort as an alternative remedy in the context of disappointed economic
expectations (Category I);106 tort as a potential remedy when the de-
fendant creates a dangerous condition or causes physical harm result-
ing in economic loss to a stranger (Category II);1o7 and third-party
effects of negligent misrepresentation or negligent performance of an
obligation (Category III).108
The first category referred to cases of pure economic loss in the
context of products liability. Rabin cited Seely and East River Steam-
ship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.109 Rabin reported that when
faced with the question of whether to extend tort law to pure eco-
nomic losses suffered by the owners of a product, courts-including
the California Supreme Court-had universally refused.110 The rea-
son for this was that public policy did not warrant tort's supremacy
over contract in cases where the only injury to the owner was eco-
nomic; in cases where the owner's injury was to her body or other
property, public policy did warrant tort's supremacy.1 1' This is a ver-
sion of the argument that Schwartz made in 1986, but with a different
emphasis and an odd omission. When Schwartz made this argument,
he emphasized the interplay of contract law and tort law as a means to
handle anyone's interest in economic well-being, not just the own-
ers'. 112 His point was that what was true in Seely was equally true in
J'Aire; as long as the plaintiff in either case could have bargained with
someone to protect his economic interests (and not necessarily the
defendant or the manufacturer) then tort law should "take a back-
seat" to private ordering.113 Seen from this perspective, J'Aire ought
to fall into Category I in Rabin's 2006 taxonomy. But we never find
out where Rabin actually believes it should fall because of a surprising
omission in his 2006 article: it never discusses J'Aire.
Category II referred to cases of pure economic loss in which the
defendant's negligence affects the world, such that the plaintiff is
106. Id. at 860.
107. Id. at 861.
108. Id. at 864.
109. Id. at 860-61; see also E. River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S.
858 (1986); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
110. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 860-61. The fact that the owner would
recover through a showing of defect without fault seems to be regarded by most commentators
as an irrelevancy in discussions over this rule. The effect of the East River rule is that an owner
could not recover outside of contract from a manufacturer even if the owner could prove negli-
gence in the manufacture of the product.
111. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 861.
112. Schwartz, Economic Loss, supra note 1, at 49-50.
113. See Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 861.
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blocked from pursuing her economic well-being. These cases are per-
haps the most familiar, and they can sometimes be classified under
one or more subheadings.114 Some scholars have focused exclusively
on these cases. 115 Rabin's statement that he focused "primarily" on
this category is curious because his lengthy discussion of J'Aire could
have been seen (and would have been seen by Schwartz) as a discus-
sion by proxy of Category I. In any event, J'Aire is a Category II case
if one equates the contractor's delay in preparing the landlord's prop-
erty as the equivalent of the driver's negligent blockage of the Brook-
lyn Battery Tunnel. And that is how Rabin developed his argument in
1985-he moved from a discussion of foreseeable but limited pure ec-
onomic loss in cases like J'Aire (which he called triangular configura-
tions) to a discussion of foreseeable but limitless pure economic loss in
cases like the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel example (which he called
cases of collateral economic loss); both of these classes of cases would
fall within what Rabin called Category II.
Oddly, there is no reference in 2006 to the argument made in 1985
that there was limited loss in the triangular configuration cases and
that limitless loss in the collateral pure economic loss cases made a
sensible difference within the Rowland model of duty. In fact, one is
left in 2006 with the impression that Rabin found it understandable
that public policy would justify an absolute bar to recovery in Cate-
gory II. Whereas the reason cited for barring Category I cases was a
social commitment to privileging contract over tort in cases involving
pure economic loss,116 the public policy reason that explained the bar
to pure economic loss cases in Category II was "the ripple-effect con-
114. Feldthusen calls this category "relational economic loss." BRUCE FELDTHUSEN, Eco-
NOMIC NEGLIGENCE: THE RECOVERY OF PURE ECONOMIC Loss 193-94 (4th ed. 2000). Bussani
and Palmer split this category into two: "[r]icochet loss" and "[c]losure of public markets, trans-
portation corridors, and public infrastructures." Mauro Bussani & Vernon Valentine Palmer,
The Notion of Pure Economic Loss and Its Setting, in PURE ECONOMIC LOSS IN EUROPE, supra
note 2, at 3, 10-13. The former category is analogous to Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,
275 U.S. 303 (1927), in which the plaintiff suffered loss when the defendant's negligent repair of
third party's boat prevented the third party from delivering the boat to the plaintiff, per their
rental contract. The latter category is obvious-it is analogous to the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel
example that Rabin borrowed from Kinsman. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Ronen Perry, The Economic Bias in Tort Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573. As
Rabin noted, a leading law and economics account for the no-duty rule for pure economic loss
explains the rule by noting the absence of social cost in such cases. Rabin, Respecting Bounda-
ries, supra note 3, at 863. Bishop's article focuses almost entirely on this category of cases,
leaving misrepresentation and negligent performance cases (Rabin's Category III) to a two-page
discussion and a reference to a separate article. W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 28-29 (1982).
116. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 860-61.
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cern."117 This public policy concern was different from the normative
abhorrence of disproportionate punishment, cited by Rabin in 1985, in
a subtle but important way. In 1985, Rabin took comfort in the fact
that the anxiety over disproportionate punishment could be addressed
by courts by drawing a line between pure economic loss cases in which
the victim was an easily identifiable "intended beneficiary" (and
hence losses would not be limitless) and those in which there were no
limit regarding the number of victims or their respective losses.11 8 By
redefining the problem as one of the inescapable interdependence of
society, 119 Rabin essentially erased the line he drew between triangu-
lar configuration cases and collateral cases-every Category II case
became a collateral case.
What is especially peculiar in his discussion of the reasons for an
absolute bar to recovery in Category II cases is that Rabin dismissed
an argument he cited in 1985 for permitting recovery in some Cate-
gory II cases; namely, triangular configurations like J'Aire. In 2006,
Rabin pointed out that unlike cases involving emotional distress, there
are no "guideposts for establishing generic characteristics of those
most likely to suffer serious harm."120 It is hard to see how Rabin's
1985 defense of J'Aire-that it was a noncontract, pure economic loss
case in which the plaintiff was an easily identifiable "intended third-
party beneficiar[y]" and hence losses would not be limitless-can be
squared with this statement.121
One reason that Rabin may have felt no urgency to defend pure
economic loss in Category II cases is that he thought that J'Aire, and
pure economic loss in general, could be best defended if viewed as a
Category III case. His third category brought Rabin full circle: it in-
cludes the case that he observed anchor the Rowland revolution:
Biakanja v. Irving.122 Rabin divided Category III into two groups.
Group I contained negligent misrepresentation cases-the familiar ac-
countancy negligent misrepresentation cases ranging from Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche'2 3 to Rosenblum.124 Group II contained cases of neg-
ligently performed obligations such as Biakanja, in which a will was
117. Id. at 861-62 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rabin's chief example of this principle
in operation was 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097
(N.Y. 2001).
118. Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1527-28.
119. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 862.
120. See id. at 864.
121. See Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1523.
122. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
123. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
124. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 857-58, 865.
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negligently prepared and an heir accordingly lost an expected inheri-
tance,125 and more modern cases such as Duncan v. Afton, Inc., in
which an employer relied upon a negligently performed drug test and
terminated an employee.126 In Group I of Category III, the plaintiff
has to point to a misrepresentation, whereas in Group II, the plaintiff
has to point to a performance; in both cases a third party is relying
upon the defendant's action and the plaintiff's economic interests are
foreseeably affected by the defendant's negligence.127
Rabin noted that it was much harder for courts to maintain an abso-
lute bar on Category III cases, and as a result, there were far more
inroads for duty in cases of negligent misrepresentation and negligent
performance of services, although the lines drawn by the courts be-
tween duty and no-duty were still somewhat hard to define.128 Rabin
observed that the rule embraced by the Restatement (Second) of Torts
for negligent misrepresentation had certain features that explained its
success among courts.129 The Restatement rule followed a middle path
between the "near privity" rule of Ultramares and the mere-
foreseeability test that, arguably, was adopted in Rosenblum: it stated
that a negligent actor whose misrepresentation could foreseeably in-
jure the economic interests of others owed a duty only to that "limited
group of persons" the actor intended to benefit or knew would be
benefited by the information provided. 30 The concern that animated
the adoption of the absolute prohibition on Category II-the ripple-
effect concern-is addressed rhetorically, if not practically, by the Re-
statement's assertion that only a limited class of persons will be
deemed to have been owed a duty.
While there is no similar black letter rule for negligent performance
of a service, Rabin noted that the emerging pattern of cases followed
the pattern set out in Biakanja: the defendant had been requested by
the third party to perform a service whose end and purpose would
affect the economic interests of the plaintiff.131 Rabin argued that in
these cases the concern that animated the adoption of an absolute
125. Id. at 863; see also Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 17-18.
126. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 867; see also 991 P.2d 739, 740-41 (Wyo.
1999).
127. Following Rabin's bifurcation of Category III, Feldthusen gives each its own heading:
"Negligent Misrepresentation" and "Negligent Performance of a Service." FELDTHUSEN, supra
note 114, at 2. Bussani and Palmer keep them under a single heading: "Reliance upon flawed
data, advice or professional services." Bussani & Palmer, supra note 114, at 13-14.
128. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 864.
129. Id. at 866.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see also Rabin, Respecting Boundaries,
supra note 3, at 865-66.
131. See Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 867-69.
[Vol. 61:615632
THE FAILED PROMISE
prohibition of duty in Category I-the possibility that tort should
"take a backseat" to contractl 32-made no sense, given that the con-
tract doctrine protecting third-party beneficiaries could not protect
the legatee and that public policy would counsel that liability should
be placed on the negligent drug tester, who could, if she wished, write
a separate indemnification contract with the third party who hired
her.133
The problem with placing J'Aire in Category III is that it proves
only too well Rabin's conclusion that the rules for pure economic loss
in this category require the "micro-scrutiny of competing policy con-
siderations." 134 If the tenant had brought his case to Rabin in 2006,
what would Rabin have predicted? Would he have said, as he did in
1985, that given the precedents of Biakanja and Heyer, a court finding
duty on the part of the contractor should be "no great surprise"?' 35
And if not, why? Would he have tried to distinguish J'Aire from
Biakanja and Heyer by pointing out that the tenant could have relied
on contract to protect his interest or that, because there were others
who depended economically on the tenant, recognizing his economic
interest would trigger a ripple-effect concern and hence require a find-
ing of no-duty? In 1985 Rabin argued, in effect, that the tenant in
J'Aire satisfied the multifactor balancing test required by Rowland be-
cause, in contrast to some pure economic loss cases, his case did not
create a risk of disproportionate punishment: the defendant would not
have to pay a huge sum of money to compensate the set of foreseeable
victims for their pure economic loss.13 6 Would the tenant in 2006 be
required, in the name of various so-called public policy concerns, to
prove that he could not have contracted around the risk or that he
belonged to a class of persons for whose economic benefit the defen-
dant had acted? These new requirements could be presented as mat-
ters of public policy, but it is not clear what public policy they serve.
Rather they seem, as Stapleton observed, to be the return of formalis-
tic legal barriers to extending duty to parties who would otherwise
satisfy the Rowland test.
132. Id. at 861.
133. See id. at 868.
134. See id. at 869.
135. Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1521.
136. Id. at 1523.
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IV. FACING REALITY: COULD J'AIRE HAVE
DELIVERED ON ITS PROMISE?
At this point I want to offer a defense of Rabin's 2006 article. It is
clear that Rabin was offering an accurate description of contemporary
duty analysis in pure economic loss cases. That is, it was certainly the
case that American tort law had turned decidedly more hostile toward
pure economic loss compared to 1985. I would like to suggest that
Rabin's own choices in his article-his recasting of the types of pure
economic loss cases and his choice not to offer J'Aire and the Row-
land approach to duty as an alternative-have also reflected an un-
comfortable analytical observation: the approach to pure economic
loss represented by J'Aire was itself ad hoc and could not form the
foundation of a larger, general principle for determining duty in pure
economic loss cases.
First, an inconvenient fact: J'Aire has not fared well, even in Cali-
fornia. In 1985 it seemed that one could argue, as did Rabin, that in
triangular configuration (Category II) cases, the balancing of factors
required by Rowland would support a finding of a duty to avoid pure
economic loss if the plaintiff's loss was a foreseeable consequence of
the defendant's negligence and there was no risk of widespread harm
or disproportionate loss. Schwartz argued that this was a mistake and
that the presence of contractual relations-either between the plain-
tiff and the defendant, as in most products liability cases, or between
the plaintiffs and some third party, as in J'Aire and many homeown-
ers' cases-would doom any effort to extend tort law into what is oth-
erwise the province of contract.137 In Aas v. Superior Court of San
Diego County, the California Supreme Court, mirroring Schwartz's ar-
gument, reasoned that in matters of pure economic loss, tort and con-
tract are dichotomous and contract should take precedence.138
Aas involved a suit by homeowners and a homeowners association
against a developer, general contractor, and subcontractors on a con-
dominium project. 139 The plaintiffs alleged defects that, while not ac-
tually causing damage to any other property (or persons), required
repair. 140 The question presented to the court, therefore, was whether
the "plaintiffs [could] recover in negligence from the entities that built
their homes a money judgment representing the cost to repair, or the
137. Schwartz, Economic Loss, supra note 1.
138. See 12 P.3d 1125 (Cal. 2000).
139. Id. at 1128.
140. Id.
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diminished value attributable to, construction defects that have not
caused property damage?"141
The California Supreme Court framed the case as a choice between
Seely and J'Aire.14 2 On the one hand, like in Seely, the homeowners
(but not the homeowners association) were direct purchasers of a de-
fective product. On the other hand, there were differences between
the facts of this case and those of Seely. For one thing, in addition to
the homeowners association, which had not been in privity with the
defendants, a number of homeowners who lacked privity with the de-
fendants because they did not buy the condominium units from the
defendant developer but from third parties who, presumably, had
bought the units from the defendant.143  Of course, following
Schwartz, one could say that even these parties could have formed
contracts to protect their economic interests against the negligence of
the defendant; the aftermarket purchasers could sue the direct pur-
chasers under a warranty, and perhaps even the homeowners associa-
tion could ask the homeowners to indemnify it for the pro rata costs
imposed by each defective home, so that the homeowners could turn
around and recapture that from the defendants.
The foregoing, however, only illustrates in what ways Aas also
looked like J'Aire. The plaintiffs, who were not in privity with the
defendant developer, were in a triangular configuration (Category II)
case. The developer had negligently performed a service for a third
party; it was foreseeable that the negligent performance of the act
would cause pure economic loss to the plaintiffs; and the plaintiffs
were a limited class of persons (for example, the homeowners and the
homeowners association). Finally, it was not apparent from the facts
that the resulting liability would be limitless or would impose dispro-
portionate punishment on the defendant. In short, the defendants' al-
leged conduct was not like blocking the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel; it
was much more like failing to properly prepare a will or properly pre-
pare a building intended to be used by a known tenant.
As some observers have noted, the Aas court did not directly repu-
diate J'Aire.144 Its application of J'Aire turned on an interpretation of
the word "injury," which suggested an implicit rejection of the idea
141. Id. at 1130.
142. Id. at 1136 ("[T]he law of construction defects ... [has] diverged into two theories: strict
products liability [recognized in Seely], . . . and the tort recognized in JAire." (citations
omitted)).
143. See id. at 1135.
144. See, e.g., Clay Wilkinson & Eric Brown, Loss Horizon: The Economic Loss Doctrine Is
Designed to Establish a Demarcation Between Contract and Tort Law, L.A. LAw., Feb. 2011, at
25, 29.
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that, outside of a few exceptions, there is a duty in negligence to avoid
foreseeeable pure economic loss. The court noted that J'Aire would
require it to apply the factors in the Rowland test, which the J'Aire
court described as "fairly subjective."1 4 5 One factor stood out from all
the others as a clear loser for the plaintiffs: "the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury."146 The court held that this factor
presented an "objective obstacle":147
Construction defects that have not ripened into property damage,
or at least into involuntary out-of-pocket losses, do not comfortably
fit the definition of appreciable harm .... [T]he physical harm tradi-
tionally compensable in tort is lacking-to ask in the words of factor
(2) whether the harm to plaintiffs was "foreseeab[le]" simply begs
the question: What harm?148
The harm alleged by the homeowner plaintiffs was, of course, that the
existence of defects lowered the value of the homes and that the re-
moval of the defects would require future expenditures; 149 the harm
alleged by the homeowners association referred to only future ex-
penditures.o50 The court's amazement that lost value realized in the
event of a future sale and future expenditures could be damages in tort
is hard to take seriously; these concepts have been applied without
comment in damage calculations throughout California in the context
of future medical expenses and lost earnings.151 The plaintiffs pointed
this out; they noted that it seemed a trivial matter that they might be
required to first voluntarily pay for the repairs, incur the costs, or sell
the homes and then sue under J'Aire.152 The court's response was that
the plaintiffs were confusing "the measurement of alleged damages"
with a legal argument that they had "suffered the type of harm cogni-
zable in tort, as opposed to contract."153
At this point it is obvious that the court was not weighing the vari-
ous factors listed in Rowland to see whether there was a duty; it was
simply asserting that, as a matter of law, there was no injury in tort,
145. Aas, 12 P.3d at 1137. Oddly, the court went back to the six factors cited in Biakanja. Id.
at 1136. It conceded that foreseeability was relevant but balked at conceding that other public
policy factors, such as the degree of the defendants' fault and the policy of preventing future
harm, clearly tipped in the plaintiffs' favor. Id. at 1138-39.
146. Id. at 1137 (quoting J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1137-38 (third alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
149. See id. at 1128.
150. Id.
151. See Connolly v. Pre-Mixed Concrete Co., 319 P.2d 343, 346 (Cal. 1957) (loss of earning
capacity); Augustus v. Bean, 340 P.2d 37 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (medical expenses).
152. See Aas, 12 P.3d at 1138.
153. Id.
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only in contract, and therefore there was no duty in tort. The discus-
sion of the other factors, regardless of which way they tipped, was
irrelevant. The court decided that the economic interests of parties
not in privity with the defendant developer would be treated just like
those of a consumer in privity with a manufacturer, pace Seely. 54
Aas may not have been the most elegantly reasoned critique of
J'Aire, but its import was clear: there was no general duty in negli-
gence to avoid foreseeable harm in triangular configuration cases;
something else was doing the work of limiting duty other than fear of
widespread harm; and other public policy factors, such as the primacy
of contract, would trump the tort claims of parties who were not even
in privity with the defendant. The question is, why was the reasoning
of J'Aire, which seemed ascendant in 1985, reversed so completely in
subsequent years?
V. CONCLUSION
This Article is not the proper place for a complete survey of the rise
and fall of the progressive impulse in tort law to which Rabin referred
at the beginning of his 2006 article. All it has attempted is to focus on
one episode of that rise and fall, and even in that area, all it has really
done is chronicle the reactions of one scholar to the rise and fall of
progressivism in that one episode. However, I will conclude by haz-
arding an explanation by way of asking a counterfactual: what would
the J'Aire approach to pure economic loss have looked like had it
been allowed to grow?
Rabin's focus in his 2006 article was not on J'Aire but on People
Express. As I argued above, while Rabin could have characterized
J'Aire as a Category II case, like People Express, he did not.155 This
would have forced him to deal with the question that is implied in his
discussion of People Express and 532 Madison Avenue, which is
whether the approach adopted in J'Aire could distinguish between
Category II cases on the basis of a principle universal to all parts of
negligence law, such as the norm against disproportionate
punishment.156
To give an example of what such a project might have looked like,
one could look to another jurisdiction that has, arguably, continued
154. This conclusion is consistent with Schwartz's discussion of Aas. See Schwartz, American
Tort Law, supra note 2, at 118 (approving of Aas).
155. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
156. See Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1534 (stating that "there is a simple and
straightforward explanation for sustained reluctance of the courts to extend" duty in pure eco-
nomic loss cases).
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the I'Aire project. As noted above, Stapleton's view of the American
approach to pure economic loss is that it took a wrong turn by main-
taining an approach that has been abandoned, in varying degrees, by
other commonwealth jurisdictions. According to Stapleton,
[N]on-U.S. common law jurisdictions, particularly in the New
World, have developed a matrix of substantive legal concerns gov-
erning the issue of recognition of liability [for pure economic loss]
that has replaced, or is in the process of replacing, the artificial
pockets approach that still bedevils the area in the United States.' 57
And what is this approach? The title given to it by Stapleton-
"middle theory" 5 8-does not say very much about where it fits in the
debate between Schwartz and Rabin described above. And, despite
Stapleton's claim that middle theory is consistent with Schwartz's own
approach (a claim about which I am quite skeptical),159 I think that a
brief review of its methodology reveals that it is not too different from
the approach adopted by the J'Aire court.
In an article published in 2002, Stapleton discussed the various les-
sons that the United States could learn from other common law juris-
dictions, especially Australia and Canada. The reason that Stapleton
suggested that American academics and judges could learn from the
experience in other common law jurisdictions was that, compared to
the other common law jurisdictions, American legal commentary on
pure economic loss was generally ignored by American judges and
therefore played no role in shaping the law.160 The experience in the
Commonwealth has apparently been a happier and more productive
one for both law professors and courts. According to Stapleton, after
a bad start with Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., which
limited pure economic loss in a Category II case to an arbitrary pocket
of activity, "rigorous academic criticism" helped push English courts
towards a "breakthrough" and the House of Lords extended liability
in a case that had a roughly analogous structure to Aas.161 Academic
criticism was especially effective in helping Australian and Canadian
courts to shift away from the pockets approach of Hedley Byrne to "a
157. Stapleton, supra note 104, at 534.
158. Id. at 532.
159. Id. at 534-35.
160. Id. at 534. Stapleton actually attributes this observation to Schwartz. Id. Why is it neces-
sarily a bad thing for courts to ignore the commentary of law professors? Res ipsa loquitur.
161. Id. at 551 (citing Junior Books, Ltd. v. Veitchi Ltd., [1983] 1 A.C. 520 (appeal taken from
Scot.) (finding the subcontractor to have a duty for pure economic loss to the purchaser)); see
also Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] 1 A.C. 465 (appeal taken from Eng.).
As Stapleton noted, the United Kingdom retreated somewhat toward the American approach in
a series of cases limiting the promise of Junior Books. Stapleton, supra note 104, at 554-57.
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more subtle approach"162 that utilized "core values and concerns that
are common across the tort of negligence."I6 3
A brief survey of the features of the middle theory reveals the fol-
lowing. First, it rejects that there is any "normative justification"
within negligence law "for the pockets approach to the duty issue."164
Second, while middle theory views foreseeability as a necessary condi-
tion, it analogizes pure economic loss to "nontraditional physical loss"
cases such as NIED and regards it as part of negligence law for which
courts have developed principles to limit liability to some subset of all
foreseeable plaintiffs.165 Finally, the principles that the courts should
apply, while fact sensitive, are not based on ad hoc public policy
claims (such as the so-called primacy of private ordering) but on nor-
mative concerns that include "that the boundaries of liability be ascer-
tainable"166 to the defendant ex ante ("the indeterminacy
concern") 167 and that the plaintiff should either have been "especially
vulnerable" or unable to "secure[] appropriate self-protection."16 8
This review of the middle theory is likely to be open to the criticism
that, by being so summary, it is inaccurate and perhaps therefore un-
helpful. Still, I think it is accurate enough to illustrate that it seems
somewhat similar in both structure and content to the interpretation
of J'Aire offered by Rabin in 1985. The two features shared by both
are the two-step process by which pure economic loss liability is ren-
dered possible but not certain by foreseeability and the role played by
judicial mechanisms to respond to the fear of widespread, or dispro-
portionate, liability. On this point, Stapleton's characterization of the
problem sounded very similar to Rabin's:
After an intense debate among academics, it is now recognized by
Commonwealth courts that, while the total extent of economic loss
and the total number of victims in an economic loss case may be
indeterminate, this factual feature need not be fatal to a claim.
There is no legal problem of indeterminacy if: first, the law can, on a
normatively justifiable basis, restrict those who can sue, and second,
this normatively justified class is reasonably determinate in terms of
its numbers (that is, the size of the class is ascertainable by parties in
the defendant's position). A parallel double requirement (that is,
normative justification plus reasonable ascertainability) applies to
the issue of the amount for which members of the class can claim.
162. Stapleton, supra note 104, at 552.
163. Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 583.
165. See id. at 582-83.
166. Id. at 537-38.
167. Id. at 547.
168. Stapleton, supra note 104, at 583.
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Indeterminacy, in other words, is now seen as merely one manifesta-
tion of the institutional concern that the boundaries of liability
should be ascertainable and based on normatively justifiable
arguments.169
Recall that Rabin noted that "general tort principles" could be em-
ployed to explain why some pure economic loss cases, like J'Aire,
could be admitted by the tort system while others, like the Brooklyn
Battery Tunnel example, could not.170 In fact-and this should be no
surprise-following the quote above, Stapleton then invoked the
Brooklyn Battery Tunnel example as precisely the class of cases that
Commonwealth courts were equipped to exclude from negligence
law.171
If middle theory worked in the Commonwealth, then there is some
reason to believe that it could have worked in the United States if
cases like J'Aire had been allowed to develop. However, as Rabin
noted in 2006, Category II cases were rejected as a class by American
courts, despite exceptions like People Express. The reason was that
there seemed to be no way to draw limits within classes of plaintiffs, as
illustrated by cases like 532 Madison Avenue.172 Therefore, the ques-
tion is: could middle theory have provided an acceptable solution to
the Category II cases that loomed so large in Rabin's 2006 article?
A preliminary analysis based on the description of various cases
Stapleton holds out as examples from which America might learn sug-
gests that middle theory cannot respond to the concerns raised by Ra-
bin in 2006. For the sake of brevity, I will offer one case as an
example.
In Perre v. Apand Property Ltd., the High Court of Australia re-
versed a no-duty ruling by a lower court.173 The defendant negligently
supplied infected seed to a farmer who grew a diseased crop of pota-
toes.174 Although the disease had not spread, a regulation prevented
growers of potatoes within a twenty-kilometer radius of the farm with
the diseased crop from exporting their potatoes to market.175 The
plaintiffs were a group of farmers who either grew or processed pota-
toes on land within twenty kilometers of the farmer who had received
169. Id. at 544.
170. See Rabin, Tort Recovery, supra note 1, at 1524.
171. See Stapleton, Comparative Economic Loss, supra note 104, at 544 (arguing that if the
court could not find a normative reason to distinguish between any subset of al the foreseeable
victims, then the court should find no duty).
172. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 861.
173. (1999) 198 CLR 180, 181 (Austl.).
174. Id. at 180.
175. Id.
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the defective seed.176 The lower court held that, although the farmer
who received the diseased seed could recover, the plaintiffs could not
recover because the court could not find any way to distinguish the
plaintiffs from others whose economic interests were affected by the
defendant's negligence but whose land or operations were outside of
the twenty-kilometer limit.177
The High Court held that there existed a class of pure economic loss
plaintiffs who were "ascertainable and limited. . . . That class should
be defined as the owners of, and the growers of potatoes on, land
within 20 km of [where the diseased potatoes were grown] . . . .
Whether or not [the defendant] knew who were the members of the
class is beside the point."178 Stapleton approved of this outcome:
[B]y limiting the scope of liability to only those ripples of economic
loss associated with plaintiffs who were vulnerable to the defen-
dant's conduct in the sense of being exclusively dependent on the
defendant taking care, the High Court ... controlled the problem of
indeterminacy of liability (as opposed to indeterminacy of total loss)
179
Yet the court noted that in allowing the plaintiffs' claims, it would
have excluded growers whose potatoes had been processed by the
processors within the twenty-kilometer boundary even though their
potatoes too would not have been permitted to go to market. 80 Simi-
larly, while the court would have permitted the pure economic loss
claims of the plaintiffs because they owned a processing plant within
the twenty-kilometer boundary, it would not have allowed claims by
processors outside the twenty-kilometer boundary who lost business
because the farmers within the boundary could not send crops to
them.18'
The distinctions drawn by the High Court in Perre do not seem to
meet the challenge raised by Rabin in 2006 in the context of 532
Madison Avenue. In that case, the New York Court of Appeals held
that no duty was owed to businesses that suffered pure economic loss
because of the closure of a street due to a negligently maintained scaf-
176. Id.
177. Id. at
178. Id. at 234.
179. Stapleton, Comparative Economic Loss, supra note 104, at 550.
180. See Perre, 198 CLR at 234 ("It would not have been easy for [the defendant] to have
ascertained the number of persons who might be affected by bacterial wilt on [land where the
defective potatoes were grown] because they have businesses of harvesting, cleaning, washing,
grading or packing within 20 km of [that land].").
181. See id. ("Moreover, the sub-regulation appears to include cleaners, washers, graders and
packers of potatoes whose premises are outside the 20 km area but who deal with potatoes
grown within that area [and these parties are outside the class].").
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fold.18 2 The reason that court held that the businesses near the scaf-
fold on the closed street were owed no duty was not, as Rabin noted,
because of a fear of crushing liability, but because of the lack of any
principled basis to distinguish between the classes of foreseeable
plaintiffs.18 3
In an economically interdependent world, proximity seems to be a
random device that reproduces the same evils as the pockets of liabil-
ity method scorned by Stapleton. But if the Commonwealth approach
produces a proximity test when faced with a Category II case like 532
Madison Avenue, then it is doubtful that it represents an approach
that could satisfy the concerns that led the courts to impose an abso-
lute prohibition of duty in Category II cases. And if we think that the
Commonwealth approach resembles the approach counseled by
J'Aire, then there is reason to suspect that the disappearance of J'Aire
from Rabin's discussion of pure economic loss is because he recog-
nized that it would not be able to meet the challenges he identified in
2006.
182. See 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1105
(N.Y. 2001).
183. See Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 3, at 861.
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